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INTRODUCTION
Shadow banking is a topic of interest on monetary policymakers and practitioners' agenda. European Central Bank (2013) recognizes the importance achieved in recent years by shadow banking within international policy debates as well as from a central banking perspective. Jeffers and Plihon (2011) argue that, in Europe, shadow banking system presents different features than that in the U.S., making it difficult to just take over the analyses and findings obtained for US and applying them to the European situation. Although for Europe there is no extended record of data on shadow banking activities, the authors suggest the refocus of studies and empirical research to European shadow banking.
Empirically speaking, quantitative research devoted to shadow banking, in particular in euro area, is still in an incipient stage, either from a financial stability, monetary policy or macroeconomic standpoint. Shortcomings in empirically modelling of the influence exerted by shadow banking activity are due, in part, to the imbalanced statistical coverage and relative short time series of the components of shadow banking system, but also to the heterogeneous nature of entities, activities and instruments that compose shadow banking. Most studies address only the conceptual perspective of the various facets of shadow banking activity and its prospects.
Our paper completes the existing strand of literature regarding shadow banking determinants by identifying a statistical relationship between the parallel banking sector, proxy by the money market funds for reasons related to data availability, and the evolution of main macroeconomic indicators. The novelty resides in employing data related to the post-financial crisis period for several EU countries. The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 reviews shadow banking definition and specificities, Section 2 investigates shadow banking ability in the monetary creation, Section 3 summarizes the most recent and significant empirical studies devoted to estimating the relationship between shadow banking and macroeconomic environment, Section 4 describes the methodology employed, the selection of variables and the results obtained, while the last section concludes.
CONCEPTUAL REVIEW OF SHADOW BANKING DEFINITION AND FEATURES
The concept of shadow banking was coined in 2007 by economist and money manager Paul McCulley in order to "describe a large segment of financial intermediation that is routed outside the balance sheets of regulated commercial banks and other depository institutions" (Noeth and Sengupta (2011) ), being a characteristic of the US financial system.
A brief definition of shadow banking states that it replicates the core functions of the traditional banking system (i.e. credit, liquidity and maturity transformation), it is exposed to a large extent to the same risks but with far less capital (Meeks, Nelson and Alessandri (2013) ).
In this respect, International Monetary Fund (2014) performed a graphical granular analysis by taking into account each segment of the euro area shadow banking and the specific risks involved at two moments of time (first quarter of 2009 and 2014). The exposure of shadow banking entities to various sources of risk is illustrated in Figure 1 . The highest exposures to maturity and liquidity risks belong to securitization, real estate investment trusts (REITs) and bond funds, while money market funds (MMFs) are most exposed to interconnectedness with regular banking and to a moderate extent to maturity risk.
Arquié and Artus (2012) provide a synthesis of features of the institutions included in the shadow banking area: i) credit intermediation; ii) non-regulated or very loosely regulated and supervised; iii) lack of support from the Central Bank or public guarantees; iv) lack of deposits made on behalf of the public; v) a balance sheet heavily dependent on financial market conditions. At the roots of shadow banking lie several economic mechanisms that motivate its activities, namely: i) specialization of loan origination, transformation and distribution; ii) no explicit public guarantee for liabilities; iii) regulatory and tax arbitrage; iv) taking advantage of mispriced tail risk (neglected risk); v) presence of asymmetric information; vi) direct involvement in money creation, by complementing mainstream banking; vii) short-term funding (Adrian (2014)).
McCulley (2009) explains that since shadow entities escaped from the Central Bank's regulatory and supervisory constraints, they do not face the same impediments as commercial banks do in terms of the amount of leverage, liquidity buffers or lending typology and investment products provided.
Noeth and Sengupta (2011) make a parallel between the sources of fragility of traditional versus shadow banking. The vulnerability of banks resides in a run by banks' depositors, while in shadow banking the run is generated by the providers of wholesale funding (i.e. money market intermediaries, repo market).
A debated issue relates to the coverage of shadow banking in terms of component entities. According to the European Central Bank (2015), the broad measure of euro area shadow banking includes money market funds, non-money market funds, financial vehicle corporations and other financial institutions. There is also a narrow measure composed only by investment funds, money market funds and financial vehicle corporations. A statistic computed by ECB (ECB (2015)) shows that € 23 trillion out of the approximately € 60 trillion of total financial system assets in the euro area are held by shadow banking entities.
On the other hand, European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA (2012)) considers that shadow banking definition should be focused more on activities rather than on entities and proposes the launch of an operational definition, since the shadow banking system is often partialy defined by the opposition to the traditional banking system. Figure 2 provides a summary of most recent definitions launched by financial institutions and researchers, which account for specific peculiarities of shadow banking components. Another subject of debate is whether shadow banking exerts a strengthening or weakening effect on the monetary policy transmission mechanism. A report issued by Deutsche Bundesbank (2014) asserts that the increase in shadow banking activity changes the relative importance of individual transmission channels, by weakening the transmission of monetary measures through commercial banks and, at the same time, amplifying the transmission effect played by asset prices and other market-based variables.
According to the National Bank of Romania (BNR (2015)), shadow banking usually develops in times of tight banking regulations or when there is increased demand for assets, as is the case of pension funds and insurance companies. IMF (IMF (2014)) also identifies several common drivers behind shadow banking growth, namely "a tightening of banking regulation and ample liquidity conditions, as well as demand from institutional investors, tend to foster nonbanking activities". ESMA (ESMA (2012)) completes the picture of the driving factors behind shadow banking development with regulatory arbitrage and risk appetite as well as investors' preference for safe assets.
Consequently, the current macroeconomic environment might be favourable to the further development of shadow banking, although regulators perceive this expansion as a major source of systemic risk.
This view is supported by CFA (CFA (2015)), which recognizes shadow banking potential for enhancing real economic activity and improving financial markets functioning, but outlines some of its threats to financial stability, such as procyclicality, interconnectedness, counterparty risk, systemic risk, low transparency and difficulty of monitoring.
IMF (IMF (2014)) tried to quantitatively estimate the historical contribution of several main subsectors of the financial system to systemic risk, by computing an indicator of marginal contribution to systemic risk. The indicator, depicting the percentage of systemic risk attributed to a given subsector has been computed distinctly for US, UK and Euro area ( Figure 3 ). The findings illustrated that, in U.S., the contribution of each subsector to systemic risk is relatively more balanced than in Europe. However, by adding the contribution exerted by US nonbank financial intermediaries, represented by shadow entities, pension funds and insurance companies, it results that the largest contribution to systemic risk belongs to them, and not to banking system. On the contrary, in the UK and Euro area, the banking system contribution dominates, exceeding 60 % of the total contribution. The IMF's explanation resides in the intrinsic features of the financial systems, which are more bank-based, as well as in the size and interconnections established between banks.
IS SHADOW BANKING INVOLVED IN MONETARY CREATION?
In this regard, the literature is widely fragmented. Ricks (2012) argues that shadow banking should not be perceived only as a financial one, but also as a monetary phenomenon, due to the presence of some interactions with the monetary system's institutional infrastructure. In his opinion, shadow banking issuance of financial instruments resembles money creation. More specifically, shadow banking is creating private money.
Sunderam (2012) empirically analysed the extent to which shadow banking liabilities might constitute substitutes for high-powered money in the banking system. His findings confirmed this hypothesis indicating that shadow banking liabilities positively respond to money demand, at least for the asset-backed commercial paper market during the period 2005-2006.
Adrian and Ashcraft (2012) believe that shadow banking involvement in credit intermediation should be seen as a financial innovation, with effects on the composition of monetary aggregates monitored and computed by central banks.
Werner (2014) explains the unique feature of money creation by banks through their ability of combining lending and deposit-taking operations, which cannot be achieved by other non-bank financial intermediaries. However, he still addresses several fundamental research questions, such as "Who can issue money?" and "Could shadow banking engage in money creation ?".
From the standpoint of monetary issues, Michell (2016) claims that shadow banking is an extension of the traditional banking system and also a money issuer. The author explains that loans granted by the parallel banking system depict many resembling features with the classic financial intermediation and the non-bank financial intermediaries providing these loans are connected to banks' activity. On the other hand, the shadow banking liabilities act as near money, respectively they are liquid short-term stores of wealth. This view is supported by Pozsar (2014) and Gordon and Metrick (2012), the latter arguing that the short-term financial resources used by shadow banking to finance their activities are a new form of money.
Jeffers and Plihon (2014) state that shadow banking monetary creation is based on avoiding capital requirements strictly imposed on to traditional banking. Their reasoning relies on the behaviour of investment banks as main actors in the parallel banking sector, who, out of thin air, created from trillions of dollars, which were later on invested in structured financial products, with no capital adequacy constraint. Thus, shadow banking has no limit in the process of monetary creation, as long as the level of capital is not regulated and the leverage is high.
In one of its analyses, Deloitte (2015) performs a more nuanced investigation on shadow banking component entities, with particular focus on money market funds (MMFs). Due to their specific mechanism of collecting financial resources and using them for financing real economy, MMFs are the meeting point, the mediator between short-term money demand and supply. They depict higher interconnections with the banking system, companies and the state, thus presently making them the subject of regulatory debates.
In this respect, the European Commission (2013) is actively concerned about designing the most appropriate regulatory framework and implementing stress tests for assessing changes in MMFs' main indicators (i.e. liquidity, interest rates, credit risk). The risk of contagion is increased by the presence of cross-country interconnections. In Europe, MMFs are highly concentrated in 3 countries (i.e. France, Ireland and Luxembourg), which holding more than 95 % of EU total assets (Table 1) . 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHADOW BANKING AND MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
A study of den Haan and Sterk (2010) covering the post-1984 period in U.S., found that traditional bank credit is positively correlated with GDP, while shadow banking credit growth is negatively correlated with GDP.
Jeffers and Plihon (2011) examined 30 European countries over a time span of 12 years, in order to assess which factors contribute to the development of shadow banking entities in different European countries. They used two sets of variables: variables describing shadow bank activities and behaviour (i.e. other financial institutions total assets/GDP, liability/assets, derivatives/total assets) and variables related to the institutional environment (i.e. money and quasi money/GDP, bank credit to private sector/GDP, market capitalization/GDP, regulation) in which these non-bank financial intermediaries operate. They applied principal components analysis to sum up most of the information contained in the initial set of explanatory variables and group countries according to similarities in terms of the two principal components identified.
Meeks, Nelson and Alessandri (2013) have developed and tested a dynamic model which simulates the interaction between banking system and shadow banking through the securitized assets channel. The results indicated that banks' securitization of loans might create a beneficial, stabilizing effect on macroeconomy, while the matching between securitization and shadow banking high leverage exposes a country's economy to increased aggregate disturbances. Deutsche Bundesbank (2014) applied a wavelet analysis, based on a flexible mathematical function, to model the statistical relationship between the money holdings of the non-bank financial intermediaries and some macroeconomic variables, namely the gross domestic product, the harmonized index of consumer prices and a share price index (DJ Euro Stoxx). The findings revealed no statistically significance between the growth rate of the real or nominal deposits of non-bank financial intermediaries and the growth rate of real GDP or the inflation rate. The presence of positive statistical significance has been found only for the share price index, with a lag of one year.
Duca (2014), on the other hand, applied co-integration models in order to investigate both the short-run and long-run determinants of the shadow or security market-funded credit in US. In the long-run, the findings suggested that regulations which disadvantaged banks had a beneficial effect by increasing the shadow banking system's share of business credit. The real price of information technology has a negative sign, while the reserve requirement tax exhibits a positive and statistically significant impact on the security market-funded share of short-term business credit. In the short run, retail deposit ceilings exert a highly significant and positive effect on shadow bank short-term business credit, the Treasury bond yield curve is highly significant and positive, and the Treasury bond spread is significant, but with a negative sign. In addition, the introduction of money market mutual funds raised the shadow bank business credit, while the introduction of deregulatory measures (such as money market deposit accounts and the passage of Dodd-Frank Act) had negative impacts.
A comprehensive empirical study performed by IMF (2014) on the shadow banking in advanced countries aimed at identifying main drivers of its growth patterns. The results suggested that a tightening of bank capital requirements creates incentives for banks to shift activities to the nonbank sector, hence positively influencing the growth of shadow banking. Banking sector size also positively determines the growth of shadow banking, an increase in the former being followed by the growth of the latter. There is a negative relationship between real short-term interest rates and respectively term spreads, and shadow banking growth. To account for those subsectors which are complementary to the banking system, the size of institutional investors has been considered as explanatory variable. The empirical relationship between institutional investors' growth and shadow banking development is positive and statistically significant.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND RESULTS
By relying on quarterly data covering the period 2008-2015, we have studied the relationship between shadow banking systems in Romania and 14 other EU countries, using several macroeconomic indicators described in the literature.
The definition proposed by the Financial Stability Board, also accepted by other EU Central Banks, was used. In Romania's case, the definition outlines that shadow banking system is composed by nonbank financial institutions, investment funds and monetary funds. According to the extended view expressed by the Financial Stability Board and by the European Central Bank, the parallel banking system includes, besides monetary funds, the financial vehicle corporations and other financial intermediaries.
Box 1. Shadow banking components in Romania
From the standpoint of shadow banking structure, composed only by nonbank financial institutions (IFN), investment funds (FI) and monetary funds (Fmon), the diverging dynamics between nonbank financial institutions' total assets and those of investment funds can be noticed, the latter having recorded a gradual decrease in the post-financial crisis period (Figure 4 ). This trend is determined by the compression of nonbank financial institutions' lending, due to banks and nonbanks low apetite for providing new loans. The value of the investment funds' total assets significantly increased (more than 4 times), following the new listings such as Fondul Proprietatea, the largest closed investment fund in Romania (with initial assets of more than 4 billion lei), and of the partial recovery of value losses recorded in the crisis period suffered by 5 Romanian financial investment societies. The lowest component, represented by monetary funds, depicted a positive evolution in the period of maximum turmoil.
However, the share of shadow banking system's total assets in nominal GDP is extremely low (i.e. less than 0,5 %), indicating that the role of this financial market component is marginal in financing real economy.
In the following, a Least Squares regression was run in order to test whether there is a significant relationship between the Romanian shadow banking total assets' variation and the two explanatory variables, namely the variation of nominal GDP and the interest rates spread, computed as the difference between interest rates for loans and those for deposits. The empirical results indicated a positive link between the variation of total assets and the variation of nominal GDP, seasonally adjusted. The coefficient of the interest rates spread is negatively correlated with shadow banking total assets' variation, suggesting the presence of a migration between the two components (mainstream and shadow banking), in search for better yields. Notwithstanding, the low value recorded by R-squared indicates that only 12.4675 % of the the variance related to the dependent variable 
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is explained by the two explanatory variables. These results are due mainly to the low number of available observations for the Romanian financial system.
The data series belonging to the 15 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden) have been collected from OECD, European Central Bank, International Monetary Fund, National Bank of Romania and the Romanian National Institute of Statistics and cover the period during the first quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2015. Keeping in mind the unbalanced samples regarding the different components of shadow banking system (financial vehicles and other financial intermediaries such as hedge funds, real estate funds etc.), we considered that monetary funds are a good proxy for the shadow banking system in considered countries. As such, data on the net value of monetary funds' assets (the dependent variable in this study) was collected for each country.
Furthermore, the quarterly data series for several explanatory variables found in the literature was extracted in order to exert an influence on shadow banking dynamics. It has been considered the real GDP, the short-term and longterm level of interest rates, the share of monetary aggregate M2 in GDP and the share of investment funds' assets in GDP, as a measure for the financial system development. In order to analyse the relationship with the capital market, it has been considered the evolution of main indices for each national market, using 2010 as the year of reference.
From the standpoint of the raw data, it can be noticed the presence of extreme values in the sample. For instance, Luxembourg is the most important centre related to the the issuance of monetary funds, while Romania is located at the opposite pole, depicting extremely low values since it holds only one monetary fund.
By relying on such data, by means of panel data regression, the statistical link between the variation of monetary funds' net assets, as a proxy for the shadow banking system, and the variation of real GDP, the short-term and long-term level of interest rates, the share of investment funds' assets in GDP, the M2/GDP ratio, and the level of stock market indices was estimated (Table 2) . As Table 2 illustrates, out of the 7 variables considered (from which one represents the first order lag of the dependent variable) only that corresponding to the real GDP is statistically significant, but with a negative sign. This result, in apparent contradiction with previous findings (which showed a positive relationship between the dynamics of real GDP and shadow banking size), might be explained through the reliance on a narrow definition for approximating shadow banking and on the peculiarities of the time horizon considered (during and postfinancial crisis).
The remaining six variables are not statistically significant, due to the presence of some redundancies between them. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized the positive sign of the coefficients for the variables describing the evolution of capital market and the long-term interest rates (explained by the orientation of investors towards higher yields and a long-term investment horizon) and the negative sign of the coefficients for short-term interest rates, the share of investment funds' assets in GDP and M2/GDP ratio.
To improve the statistical relevance of the relationship between our variables, we performed again the panel regression, with fewer variables. For instance, by considering as explanatory variables only the real GDP variation, the M2/GDP ratio and the stock market index, it has been obtained statistically significant coefficients. The signs associated with these coefficients are identical with those in the previous regression, but in this case the variables are highly statistically significant (Table 3) . Similarly, by considering as explanatory variables the stock market index, the M2/GDP ratio and long-term interest rates, the empirical results indicated that shadow banking evolution is positively correlated with the capital market and the level of interest rates (see table 4). It is of interest the negative relationship between the monetary aggregate M2 as a share of GDP and shadow banking size. The explanation comes from the mere composition of M2, which includes currency in circulation and deposits of all maturities. When deposits' interest rates follow a decreasing trend, people looking to save or investat higher yields tend to shift to other types of financial investments, which the mainstream banking might not provide. Thus, the financial resources collected by banks by means of deposits record a decrease, which further impacts their ability to grant loans. Consequently, the financing of real economy through bank loans compresses, the money supply through the traditional banking channel decreases, being supplemented by an increase in shadow banking volume of activity.
Another argument for the statistical relationship identified resides in the variable we used as proxy for shadow banking, namely money market funds (MMFs). As European Commission (2013) states, MMFs depict some features equivalent to bank deposits, as follows: collects cash from investors for short time periods, offers instantaneous access to liquidity and stability of value. It should also be mentioned that, in this respect, the literature lacks a robust empirical testing or a generally accepted view.
CONCLUSIONS
It is becoming more readily agreed that shadow or parallel banking system acts as a complement to and not a substitute for traditional banking. The findings of our study are in line with this remark. By relying on data for 15 European countries, we have identified a linear relationship between the evolution of shadow banking and several macroeconomic indicators. The findings confirmed a positive relationship between shadow banking size and stock market indices and long-term interest rates. In other words, there is a pattern of investor behaviour, in times of stock market or interest rates increases, to focus on identifying investment alternatives that generate higher yields.
Moreover, it has been identified a negative link with the development of investment funds which might be explained by the migration of investors from investment funds to less restrictive investment vehicles in respect of investment policies. The negative relationship holds also for M2/GDP, suggesting that, in times of shadow banking expansion, the financing through the traditional banking channel decreases, as banks cannot create money.
It has to be mentioned that these results have been obtained for a number of 15 European countries, a geographic area where shadow banking is less developed that that in US. In addition, the results are highly dependent on the shadow banking definition and quantification, as well as on the breaks in the series or unbalanced number of observations across selected countries.
